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POLICE INTERROGATION
CONFESSIONS:
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The 1960's and 1970's
look like history now.
by Yale Kamisar
Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
[The fo llowing is based on Professor Yale Kamisar 's
introduction (written on December 30, 1979} to his newly
published Police Interrogatio n and Confessions : Essays in
Low and Policy (University of Michigan Press , 1980} . These
essays, written over two decades, constitute an historical
overview of the Supreme Court's efforts to deal wit h the
police interrogation-confessions problem from preMirando da ys to the present time and provide provocative
analyses of the issues that ha ve confronted the Cour t along
the wa y.
Before deciding to publish a collection of Kamisar's
essays on confessions, the University of Michigan Press
asked for e valuations from two of the current lead ing
writers on the subject, Professor Joseph D. Grano of Wayne
State University Law School and Professor Welsh S. White
of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law . Professor
Grano wrote : "These essays, singularly or as a whole , are
unri valed in the literature . ... The starting po int for a
student of the area . . . . Required reading for anyone
contemplating the directions the Court should take in the
future ." Professor White commented : "There reall y is no
competing work in the field . .. . No one e xplores
fundamental issues of constitutional law more inte nsely
and more incisively. No one writes with more pow er and
clarity.")
Despite appeara nces to the con trary, I never p la nned to
wr i le a series of articles on police interrogation and
co nfessio ns. My first ar ticle on the subject, "Wh at Is an
'Involuntary' Confession? " , was not part of a grand design
but merely a response to an invitation by the Rutgers Low
Review to review a new edition of th e Inbau-Reid
int errogation manual. Unti l the n , alth ough I had written a
number of articles on oth er cri minal procedure issues , I had
never wrestled in prin t with the po li ce interrogation confessions prob le m.
Wh en, in 1963 , I did fina ll y get arou nd to writing about
confessions (th e Jnbau-Reid "book review" grew into an
article and was published as such), it was later than I
thought. Before I had finished the project, Winston Massiah
[who had lost in th e United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circu it) and Danny Escobedo (who had lost in the
Supreme Court of Illi nois) were see king review in the

United States Supr e me Court , and one Ernesto Mirandawhose case would , in three years , push even the famous
Escobedo and Massiah decisions off center stage-had been
arrested for , and had confessed to, kidnapping and rape .
Thus , although I was unaware of these cases at the time ,
let along the significant ways in which the y would change
our thinking about the law of confessions , m y first
confessions article turned ou I to be one of the last ever
writt e n about the " voluntariness"-" totality of the
circumstances" test (at least until the 1980s) .
I had no inte n tion of starting work on another piece about
the subject so soon after the appearance of my Rutgers
article, but a year later a member of the Magna Carta
Commission of Virginia , Professor A. E. Dick Howard,
persuaded me otherwise . For one thing, Professor Howard
assured me that my remarks could be quite brief. For
another , since my first article on the subject had been
published , the Supreme Court h ad handed down two very
interesting and highl y controversial cases, Massiah and
Escobedo. And after all , as Professor Howard reminded me ,
the 750th anniversary of Magna Carta does not come along
every da y.
So I agreed to gi ve a talk at the Co ll ege of William and
Ma r y in February of 1965, contrasting the largely
unregulated and unscrutinized practices in the police
station-the "gatehouse ," where ideals are checked at the
door and "realities" are faced-with the proceedings in the
courtroom-the "mansion, " where the defendant is "even
dignified, the public invited , and a stirring ceremony in
honor of individual freedom from law enforcement
celebrated ." How , I asked , can we reconcile the
proceedings in the "mansion" with those in the
"gatehouse " -through which most defendants journey and
beyond which many never get? How can we explain why
the Constitution requires so m uch in the "mansion, " but
means so little in the "gatehouse"?
When published some months later. along with essays by
Professor Fred E. Inbau and Judge Thurman Arnold , in
Criminal Justice in Our Time, my remarks , "Equal Justice in
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Proc edure, " were anything but brief. I h ad spent months
revising and expanding th e origina l William and Mary
sp eech . ...
A number of commentators who had arrived on the scene
before me contributed much to my earl y writi ng on the
subject : Professors Francis Allen, Albert Beisel, Charles
McCormick, Bernard Meltzer , Monrad Paulsen and Claude
Sowle ; and a young civil liberties lawyer [who was to file a
sp lendid brief in the Escobedo case). Bernard Weisberg .
But the root fro m which I drew the juices of indignation , I
am convinced , was the tape recording of the six-hour
interrogation in the 1962 Biron case .
This was not simply a tape re cording of a confession (they
are not that rare). but of the interrogation itself-beginning
with the first interrogator 's opening remark (there were
five interrogators in all) and the suspect 's initial response .
The decision to record the interrogation was not made with
the intent to offer the tape in evide nce or with an y
expectation that it wou ld ever appear in the record. (Som e
of the interrogators didn ' t even realize that their remarks
were being taped .) Most, if not all, of the detectives who
in terrogated Biron had been questioning murder suspe c ts
for years . There is no reason to think that the essential
thrust and basic features of the Biron int e rrogation were
an y diffe rent from those that these sam e detectiv es had
conducted in dozens of oth e r cases. Inde ed . if the various
" how-you-do-it" and " how-we-did-it-ourse lves" manu als
are a ny indication , th e "interrogation atmosphe re"
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establi hed b Biron's interrogators and most of the tactics
they emplo ,ed were standard practice. Yet, as far as I
kno . the Biron confession-the onl one accompanied b a
tape of the interro ation-was the only confession obtained
b any of Biron's interrogators that a court ever excl uded.
If the Biron interro ation had been an extraordinar
instance of" renching from [an accused] evidence which
ould not be extor ted in open court with all its safeguards. "
the tape r ecordin would h a e been a good deal less
troublesome. But it was not "an ex hibit in a museum of
third degree horrors." For the most part, rather, it was a
i id illustration of th e kinds of interrogation practices that
at the time satisfied the best standards of professional
police work and fell within the bounds of what the courts of
that da called "fair and reasonable " questioning. Even the
state supreme court that struck down Biron 's conviction (on
the narrow ground that false lega l a dvice by the police had
itiated the confession) repeate dl y characterized the
interro ation sessions as "i nte rviews ."
"Inte r iews"? How can anyone who listens to the tapes
call th e interrogation sessions that? How can anyone listen
to the insistent questioning of Biron and to the many
different wa s his interrogators urged, cajoled, and nagged
him to confess without feeling the relentless pressure,
without sensin Biron's confusion and helplessness , without
etting the message-confess now or it will be so much the
worse for ou later-and without wondering: what ever
happ e ned to the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to the assistance of counsel?
A yea r after the "gatehouses and mansions" essay
appea red , the Supreme Court decided Miranda-the case
that has come to s mbolize the Warren Court's "revolution"
in American criminal procedure . Miranda , especially the
three dissenting opinions in the case , produced the only
"se lf-initiated " co nf essions article I ha ve ever written, "A
Dissent from the Miranda Dissents. "
For some time I had been one of those who had
app lauded the direction in which th e Warren Court was
moving-catching heavy fire for doing so in various
meetin s of the Advisor y Committee to the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
project and in other professional gatherings . Thus I
welcom ed Miranda . But when, a short time after the
decision had captured the headlines, I attended the annual
meetin of the American Bar Association , it was plain that I
was in the distinct minorit . When I met with the chief
ju tices of the states (whose annual meeting was held at
about the same time) and participated in a series of
confessions "wo rkshop sessions" with them , I was struck b y
their overwhe lmin opposition to the recent confession
rulin .
Even before the imperfections in Chief Justice Warren's
opinion for the Court in Miranda were brought into sharp
focus by the new prodding of the facts of subsequent
confession cases, it could not be denied that various
portions of the long opinion left something to be desired.
But there would be no shortage of commentators to spotlight
the warts and blemishes. I feared, however , that in the
hue nd er over Mirando, few, if any, wou ld dwe ll on the
w akne es in the dissenting opinions. (It is much easier, it
ha alway
emed to me, to take pen in hand when one is
di tressed b ad cision than when one is content with it.)
In my jud m nl-and this was the primar thrust of m
article-the Mirando dissents were far more vu lnerable to
criticism than th majorit . opinion. Althou h th e Mi rando
di senters stil1 proclaimed the virtues of the old
"voluntarin s "t st. the old test had proved to be high}
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elusi ve, largely unworkable, and woefull y ineffective.
Although th e Mirando dissenters expressed astonishment at
how the Court had managed to bring the privilege against
self-incrimination into the police station, more wondrous , I
thought, was how the courts had managed to keep it out for
so II_lan y ears.
About a decade after I had said a few good words for
Mirando (and man y bad ones about the old "voluntariness''
test), th e death of my senior colleague, Paul G. Kauper
(1974), and the retirement from teaching of my old
adversary, Fred E. Inbau (1977) , caused me to return to the
confessions topic.
Ka up e r's proposed remedy for the third degree was
written way back in 1932 (when he was still a third-year law
student)-four ye ars before the Supreme Court first
impose d the "voluntariness" test on the states as a matter of
fourteenth amendment due process . Although he was not
the first to offer a judicially supervised interrogation
procedure as the solution to the "confessions problem," he
seems to have been the first to deal in any comprehensive
way with the practical, policy, and constitutional
considerations involved in such a proposal. When the
editors of the Michigan Low Review asked me to reexamine Kauper 's article in the light of 40 years of
subsequent developments , I could not resist the opportunity
to do so .
Inbau had been an outstanding interrogator himself and
had taught many hundreds of others how to practice the art.
He was the leading police-prosecution spokesman in
academe and a longtime critic of the Court. Not only had he
joined with others in criticizing the Warren Court for
handing down Escobedo and Miranda, but a generation
earlier he had also reproached the Stone Court for deciding
McNabb (1943) and Ashcraft (1944).
Moreover, although many had attacked the Miranda
decision , none had done so with Inbau's gusto . Miranda was
the case that Inbau had feared , and had tried to head off,
for most of his professional career . Nor was it any comfort
to him that the Miranda opinion had quoted from or cited
his manuals no less than ten times-never with approval.
"If Mirando is a monument to anyone, " Judge George
Edwards had observed at the time , "perhaps it is to Fred
Inbau. "
I had , as the editors of the Journal of Criminal Low
described it , "tilted swords with Inbau many times, both in
print and face-to-face." So when the Journal editors invited
me to sum up and reflect upon Inbau's rich , colorful career ,
I could not refuse .
When I started writing my comments on Kauper's article,
I did not know that I would end up finding a modernized
version of his proposal, what I called the Kauper-SchaeferFriendly model,* as attractive an alternative to the Mirando
mod e l as I did . Nor did I know that I would express as much
disappointment in Mirando as I did . Similarly, when I
started work on the piece about Inbau I did not think I
would view him as sympathetically as I wound up doing. In
a sense each article "wrote itself ."
Perhaps the best examples of how articles can "write
th e mselves" are the last two essays in this collection. No
sooner had I finish e d the Inbau piece than the Georgetown
Low Journal editors asked me to write a short preface to
th e ir "Ci rcuits No tes'' (an annual survey of fed eral
appe ll ate deci sions dealing with criminal procedure),
reminding me that Justice William 0 . Douglas had written
the pref ace the previous ea r.
•tn lhc )ale 1!160s. firsl Ju li e Walter Schaefer and 1hen Judf!e Henry Friend! .. 1wo of
1h mosl minenl cril1cs of F.scnhedn and 1,rondo. had in effect relurned lo and bu ill
upon thP nld KAuper propo~.1'

I yielded . I had become quite interested in a new
confessions case, Brewer v. Williams (the so-called
Christian burial speech case).t and the Georgetown editors
readily agreed that it was a case worth highlighting in a
preface to the "Circuits Note ." All that was expected of me,
and all I promised myself I would do. was a three- or fourpage comment on the Williams case. Surely I could do that
in a few days. Besides, it would be nice to "succeed " Justice
Douglas. if only in one respect.
The roots of the 1977 Williams decision were to be found
in the 1Y64 Massiah case . Decided only a few weeks before
the more famous Escobedo case, Massiah seemed to say
that the filing of an indictment, or the initiation of other
adversary judicial proceedings, marks an "absolute point"
at which the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches .
Until the recent decision in Brewer v. Williams, however,
there was good reason to think that Massiah had only been a
steppingstone to Escobedo and that both cases had been
more or less displaced by Mirando . But Brewer v. Williams
made plain that despite the Court's shift from a "right to
counsel base" in Escobedo to a "compelled selfincrimination base" in Mirando, the Massiah doctrine was
still very much "alive and well." It had emerged as the
other major Warren Court confessions rule .
In the pro cess of revivifying Massiah, however, the
Williams case, I feared, had blurred the Massiah and
Mirando rationales . Although this was not clear from the
Williams opinion. the Massiah doctrine has nothing to do
with "custody" or "interrogation," the key Mirando
concepts.
When Massiah made incriminating statements. he was
unaware that he was dealing with a government agent. He
thought he was simply talking to a friend and co-defendant.
There is no indication that he was ever "interrogated" (as
that term is normally used) or "compelled" to speak or
"restrained" of his liberty in any way . But a government
agent had "deliberately elicited" statements from him after
he had been indicted and retained counsel and while he
was out on bail. The government , Massiah held , cannot do
this-either directly, by means of a uniformed officer. or
indirectly, by means of a "secret agent"-once adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated . Massiah
represents a "pure right-to-counsel" approach.
The suspect in the Williams case was plainly in "custody"
when given the "Christian burial speech," and arguably the
speech was a form of "interrogation." Thus , the
incriminating disclosures might hove been excluded on
Mirando grounds. But the Williams Court chose to decide
the case on the basis of Massiah rather than Mirando. Once
it did so, once it chose to rest on "sixth amendmentMossioh" rather than "fifth amendment-Mirando " grounds,
there was no longer any need to consider whether the
Christian burial speech constituted police "interrogation."
All that mattered was that a government agent, by means of
the spe e ch, had deliberately elicited incriminating
statements from a person after adversary proceedings had
commenced against him . (Moreover, although I do not think
this is necessary to trigger the Massiah doctrine, Williams
was also represented by counsel at the time.)

tWi lli nms. suspec ted or m urde ri ng a you n~ gi rl in Des M oi nes. Iowa. su rre nder ed
h1m seH 10 thP Dave nport. Iowa, police Ca ptain Lea min g and anot her Des Mo ines
de1ecl 1\'e went lo Onven port lo pick up W illi ams and drive him back 10 Des Moi neli Iso me
rnn mil es ,n va~ I B, lhe li me lhe two Des Moines ofri ce rs arri ved in Davenporl. adve rsa r v
Ju di cia l p roceechn ~~ had alr ead, co mm enced a~a in st Wi lli ams. and he had alreadv
·
re lnined counsel On the re l um trip , (tdmi ll edly in an effort to i nduce W illi ams to ~evea l
lhc locfllion or lh t~ >e•rl hody . Ci:tp tain Lea rn in s,{ remarke d 10 W illi ams· "IYlou yourse lr
,1rf' lhe onh prr'inn 1hn 1know~ where the little ~i rl 's bod y 1s
I fee l th a1ll he pa rents I

N evertheless, the Williams majority evidentl y thought it
important , if not crucial , to establish that the Christian
burial speech did amount to "interrogation"-but all four
dissenters insisted it was not. The Christian burial spee ch , I
am convinced. did happen to be a form of " Mirando
interrogation," but it did not hove to be in order for the
Massiah doctrine to have protected Williams .
What I have said above is pretty much all I wanted to say,
and planned to say, about the Williams case in my preface
to the "Circuits Note ." Somehow. however, what began as a
very modest project took on a life of its own . Before I was
able to call a halt-more than a year , 130 printed pages , and
600 footnotes later-two separate articles had more or less
"written themselves ."
The three- or four-page preface had already grown into a
15-page foreword when I dipped into the Williams record to
clarify a point. I had a great deal of difficulty ever getting
back out. I found the record incomplete , contradictory, and
confusing.
For one thing, although neither the Supreme Court nor
other courts which had mulled over the Christian burial
speech seem to have been aware of this, the police captain
who had rendered the speech had given one version of it at
a pretrial hearing and, in my view , a significantly different
version at the trial itself. Moreover , as I read the record,
there was a distinct possibility that during the five-hour
drive to Des Moines. the captain had delivered more than
one Christian burial speech. But this point, along with many
others , had never been adequatel y explored at the trial.
Williams sharpl y disputed the captain on many points
but. as might be expected. no court paid any attention to
what he had to say. Yet whenever the captain got into a
"swearing contest" with Williams 's lawyers. as he did on
three occasions. he lost every time . Doesn ' t this raise
serious questions about the swearing contest the captain
won when he disputed Williams?
The woefully inadequate Williams record underscored
the need , whenever feasible [and I think it was feasible in
the Williams case). to record all police "interviews" or
"conversations" with a suspect , and all warnings and
" waiver transactions " as well. Why, after all these years,
were police interrogators still able to prevent objective
recordation of the facts? A police interrogator , no less than
the rest of us , is inclined to reconstruct and reinterpret past
events in a light most favorable to himself. As long as he is
permitted to be "a judge of his own cause" in this sense , any
confessions rule, I feared . would be "a house built upon
sand ."
What began as a te xtual footnote describing the
unsatisfactory condition of the Williams record grew into a
separate section-one that eventually became so large that
it dwarfed the rest of the article . (Moreover , I had yet to
compl e te the r est of the article .) There could be only one
solution, and the Georgetown editors , growing frantic at m y
inabilit y to finish the piece. quickl y concurred: I had to pull
out the anal ysis of th e record from the unfinished
manuscript and run it b y itself as the foreword to the
" Circuits Note ." Thus e merged " Fore word : Bre we r v.
Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record ."
I agreed that at a later date I would return to and
compl e te my a ppraisal of the various Williams opinions in
light of Mirando , Massiah , and other cases and th a t I would
publish this discussion as a separate second articl e.
Ev e ntuall y I did- but not be for e adding thre e major
sec tions that I had neve r conte mplat e d writing wh e n I first
took on the assi gnme nt.
In th e cours e of prese nting som e h ypoth e tica ls d e sign e d
to illu s trat e th e diffe ren ces betwe e n the Mirando a nd

shou ld he rn11 1l ed In .i Christian buria l for l!h eirl li11le Rir l land 1h a q we shou ld s1or· and
lnr.,1 1e 11 hr horh Inn 1hr way I hack 10 Des Mo in es I "
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Ma ssiah a ppro ach es, I discovered that the applicability of
th ese d oc trine s to th e use of " jail plants " and other " secret
age nts" wa s a goo d d e al more complicated than I had
s usp ecte d . This le d to a 25-page treatment of that subject.
A lth o ugh , as I h ave alread y indicated, I was convinced that
" inte rroga ti o n " w a s constitutionally irrelevant for Massiah
p urpos es. I , too. could not resist the temptation to discuss
w h et h e r , in an y eve nt, the Christian burial speech did
a mo unt to " int e rrogation ." This led to a twent y-page
d isc ussion of th e ge n e ral problem.
At this p oint I had done all that I had originally set out to
d o, a nd consid e rabl y more. But I felt the article still needed
a n "e nding ." It had grown so large that it was no longer
~n o ugh simpl y to compare and contrast how the Mirando
a nd Massiah doctrines worked . I felt the need to appraise
th e ir re lative strengths and weaknesses and to consider the
m e rits of a third approach as well-New York 's DonovonA rthur-Hobson rule . Under the New York rule (a first
cousin to Massiah ), regardless of whether adversary
pro cee dings have commenced or whether the suspect is
willing to waive his Mirando rights, once an attorney
"e nters th e picture" (a phone call to the police department
ce ntral switchboard will suffice), the state is prohibited
from " int e rfering with the attorney-client relationship" by
qu estioning the suspect in the absence of counsel.
Th e Massiah doctrine and the New York rule each have a
ce rt a in n e at logic and a strong symbolic attractiveness, and
it is n o t inconceivable that either or both will outlast
Mirando . After 30 pages of "further thoughts," however, I
co nclud e d that there was less to be said for Massiah or the
Ne w York rule than for the basic Mirando approach.
What eve r its shortcomings , Mirando tried to take the
" police interrogation " -"confessions" problem by the
throat. I did not see how the same could be said for either
Ma ssiah or the New York rule . Both , rather. turn on nice
distin c tions that se e m unresponsive to either the
gove rnm e nt 's need for evidence or a suspect's need for "a
la w ye r 's help ."
Thus e merged what is , b y a wide margin. the longest
confe ss ions article I have ever written-"Brewer v.
William s, Massiah , and Mirando : What Is 'Interrogation' ?
Wh e n Does It M a tt e r ?"
Th e e arl y a nd middle 1960s were exciting times for
s tud e nts of crimin a l pro ce dure . The 1970s, if less exciting,
we r e no le ss int e resting . Nor were the y without
co n trove rsy. De p e nding upon one 's viewpoint, they were a
ti m e of r e-examination , correction , consolidation , erosion ,
o r re tr ea t.
Hi s to ry. it has well be e n said , " never looks like history
w h e n you ar e li ving through it. It alwa ys looks confusing
a nd m essy . ... " [John W . Gardner , Ha zard and Hope, in No
Easy Vic to ri es 169 (1968) .] But the 1960s and 1970sfook like
h is to ry now . H op e full y th e combination of these seven .
essays. w ritt e n durin g a pe riod of unprecedente d change m
Am e ri ca n co nstituti o nal-criminal proce dure , constitute a
use fu l hi s tori ca l ove rvi e w of the Supreme Court's efforts to
d e al w ith a m os t tro ubl e som e and most controversial
cluster of p robl e ms. Hop e full y, too , th ese essa ys contribute
s ign ifica ntl y to a n a n a lysis of th e constitutional and policy
issues th at co nfro nt e d th e Court along th e wa y.
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In the 1960s those who shared my outlook on the crimina l
justice system celebrated various victories. But events in
the 1970s reminded us that here , as elsewhere, "there is no
final victory. However great the triumph, it is ephemeral.
Without further struggle , it withers and dies." [Francis A.
Allen, On Winning and Losing, in Law, Intellect and
Education 16 (1979] .] In the 1980s we may have to remember
what Allen, Paulsen, and other commentators of the 1950s
never forgot-there is no final defeat, either.

Yal e Ka misar

